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SUMMARY 
There is general consensus that to achieve employment growth, especially for vulnerable 
groups, it is not enough to kick-start economic growth – skills among both the high- and 
low-skilled population need to be improved. In particular, we argue that if the lack of 
graduates in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) is a true problem, 
it  needs  to  be  tackled  via  tangible  incentives  and  not  simply  by  public  campaigns: 
students are not enrolling in ‘hard-science’ subjects because the opportunity cost is very 
high.  
As far as the low-skilled population is concerned, this paper encourages EU and national 
policy-makers to invest in a more comprehensive view of this phenomenon. The ‘low-
skilled’  label  can  hide  a  number  of  different  scenarios:  labour  market  detachment, 
migration, and obsolete skills that are the result of macroeconomic structural changes. For 
this reason lifelong learning is necessary to keep up with new technology and to shield 
workers from the risk of skills obsolescence and detachment from the labour market.  
igh and increasing unemployment is at the top of the policy agenda, especially with regard to 
young people. There is general consensus that to achieve employment growth, especially for 
vulnerable groups, it is not enough to kickstart economic growth, skills among both the high- 
and low-skilled population also need to be improved. 
However, we need to move beyond simplified narratives and generic policies and better understand the 
phenomena. In this Policy Brief, we focus on two issues that are frequently misunderstood by EU-level 
institutions.  
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We believe that academic and policy discussions about low-skilled workers has long been driven by an 
over-simplified approach that has tended to characterise the low-skilled as a homogeneous group - across 
as well as within countries. Put simply, the problem with EU policy is that while there are many realities 
of low skill, there is only one generic policy response. 
Regarding  the  high  skilled,  company  surveys  and  statistics  report  a  lack  of  graduates  in  science, 
technology,  engineering,  and  mathematics  (STEM)  that  persists  despite  the  expansion  of  higher 
education. Policy interventions have been limited to the provision of better information to students via 
campaigns  whose  objective  is  to  attract  them  towards  hard  sciences.  New  research  shows  that  the 
problem might not be one of information, but of incentives. Properly calculated costs and benefits do not 
favour the study of ‘difficult’ subjects. To encourage students to major in these subjects, therefore, policies 
should be geared towards both better information dissemination and the provision of new incentives. 
1.  Science graduates need new incentives 
When higher education was an elite pursuit, it did not matter as much what and where one studied as the 
fact that he (or, in a smaller number of cases, she) participated in tertiary education at all. Since the 1960s, 
Europe has gradually moved towards mass higher education, with the European Union recently setting 
itself the goal of having 40% of young people with a higher education degree by 2020 (in the 30-34 year 
age cohort). It is reasonable to expect that as the group of university graduates grows, within-group 
heterogeneity will also increase, in that different labour market outcomes can be expected for graduates 
from different faculties. To what extent has this really happened and what are the policy implications?  
European analysts and policy-makers appear to have a clear understanding of the issue. EUROPE 2020, 
the flagship EU policy strategy document, states: “At national level, Member States will need to ensure a 
sufficient supply of science, maths and engineering graduates.”  
This  is  based  on  research  that  shows  that  “the  current  supply  of  STEM  skills  is  considered  to  be 
insufficient and when combined with forecast growth in demand for STEM skills, these shortages present 
a potentially significant constraint on future economic growth in Europe.” At the same time, applied 
research highlights the fact that “those with specific degrees do better than those with more general 
degrees (arts and humanities).” 
There is a gender dimension to the choice of a field of study. While female students are now in the 
majority  in  tertiary  education,  the  share  of  female  students  in  science,  technology,  engineering  and 
mathematics  remains  only  around  one  third,  with  little  variation  across  countries.  The  European 
Commission  recently  stated  that  it  is  “a  key  challenge  for  Member  States  and  for  higher  education 
institutions to attract a broader cross-section of society into higher education” noting that the need to 
make STEM education more attractive to women is “a well-known… challenge”.  
This points a to a conundrum – if studying ‘difficult’ subjects such as STEM leads to better employment 
and pay prospects, why is students’ motivation “insufficient”? It is interesting to observe that in the five 
countries considered, the number of graduates in STEM subjects increased, consistently with the more 
general  educational  expansion,  but  the  share  of  STEM  graduates  in  the  total  remained  constant  in 
Slovenia,  increased  in  Poland  and  slightly  decrease  in  France,  Italy  and  Hungary.  On  average  they 
amount to one-quarter of new graduates each year. Either this is irrational decision-making on the part of 
students or a lack of relevant information or, in case of women and STEM, it can be explained by an 
unfortunate historical legacy of a past in which majors like engineering and physics were 100% male-
dominated.  
Recent research from the NEUJOBS project sheds some light on this dilemma by analysing the net present 
value (NPV) of university education by field of study in five countries (France, Italy, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovenia). We contend that the current research examines only part of the equation because it tends 
to look at only SOME of the benefits (employment prospects and salaries of graduates). Private returns to 
education should include a broader set of variables. The main one is the higher cost of study to students THE OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF STEM DEGREES AND THE UNMET NEEDS OF THE LOW-SKILLED | 3 
 
in terms of time, which significantly influences their opportunities to work while studying or to complete 
their education in a relatively short time. 
Once both costs and benefits of tertiary education are considered, studying STEM is often not the best 
deal  for  students.  Data  indicate  good  labour  market  outcomes  in  terms  of  salaries  and  employment 
opportunities: in most cases graduates from STEM score better than their peers in other sectors, which is a 
signal that the market values and demands their skills. But the system fails on two major points: costs, 
especially opportunity costs, associated to the degree and a strong gender bias.  
As far as the latter is concerned, we should underline that better labour market outcomes only pertain to 
male graduates. When a female student leaves university with a STEM degree she has far lower chances 
of success: in terms of salaries and the likelihood of employment in the first five years after graduation, 
female students are much better off studying medicine or social sciences in all five countries. As a result, 
the net present value of education presents a wide gap for STEM when male and female graduates are 
compared, which explains why so few female students study in écoles polytechniques. 
Figure 1. NPV of tertiary education for STEM graduates, 5 years from graduation, male and female compared 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on HEGESCO/REFLEX datasets. 
This underperformance has been the subject of debate: according to some authors (Hall, 2007 and Hewlett 
et al., 2008) it is due to long working hours, a ‘macho’ culture and lack of transparency in career paths. 
Hunt (2012) argues that it is because of dissatisfaction with pay and promotion opportunities. Our data 
indicate that there is a clear wage gap, which supports the latter hypothesis.  
The second main failure concerns costs. Statistics show that before obtaining a degree, STEM students 
face higher costs than their peers from other faculties. These costs are not necessarily linked to fees1 but 
rather to the time spent in universities: both in terms of hours spent on study (which translates into fewer 
hours available for part-time jobs) or in terms of the years needed to complete the courses. This makes the 
opportunity cost of graduating from STEM higher than for social and human sciences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
1 Which are equalised across subjects in each country in the analysis.  
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Figure 2. Hours studied (classes plus personal work) by field in the five countries  
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on HEGESCO/REFLEX datasets. 
As a consequence, those that still decide to enrol in STEM (in particular female students) despite the high 
costs, are either very bright and expect to take less time than the average to complete the course, or have 
the means to afford more years or hours in education (or both).  
The important lesson to take from this analysis is that students decide rationally or, at least, that their 
decisions  make  economic  sense.  This  creates  a  comfortable  margin  of  manoeuvre  for  policy-makers. 
Policy  action  should  therefore  switch  from  launching  useless  campaigns  to  providing  incentives  for 
students, especially women, to compensate for the high opportunity costs associated with a STEM degree. 
2.  N worlds of low-skilled, but only one generic policy 
The  low-skilled  are  often  mentioned  in  European  policy  documents  because  having  low  skills  is 
associated  with  negative  labour  market  outcomes  (lower  employment  rate  and  salaries,  higher 
unemployment, higher inactivity, etc). Nevertheless, ‘the low-skilled’ are lumped together in a rather 
indistinct category that tends to be linked solely to initial formal education (in the EU2020 strategy, the 
specific target is to reduce the share of early school leavers to below 10%).  
Research  from  the  NEUJOBS  research  project  shows  that  such  a  one-size-fits-all  approach  does  not 
produce  the  expected  outcome  of  creating  more  and  better  jobs  for  the  low-skilled.  People  who  are 
labelled as low-skilled happen to be so for a number of reasons. The simplest reason is that they leave 
school  without  any  formal  qualification.  These  are  the  low-skilled  in  a  strict  sense  since  they  only 
completed up to lower secondary school. Today they make up 29% of the working age population. The 
share of low-educated people has significantly decreased in recent decades due to continuing educational 
expansion, but this process has occurred to differing degrees across the EU. If fewer and fewer people 
leave school without a diploma, the effect of educational expansion is that the increase in the supply of 
workers with secondary and tertiary education will further undermine the position of the non-educated, 
especially the younger ones, who are in the worst position among their cohorts and are more easily 
stigmatised. This also happens because educational expansion goes hand in hand with an upward shift in 
the overall skill-set required by employers. This is not limited to diplomas but also concerns experience 
and non-cognitive skills. 
Yet, a low level of education is not the only cause of being low-skilled. Workers can have a higher level of 
education  and  yet  end  up  unemployed  or  in  a  low-skilled  job  for  two  main  types  of  reason:  both 
individual-level and macroeconomic/structural. The latter includes the polarisation of labour demand: 
during the past decade the demand for middle-skilled occupations remained, at best, stagnant, while in 
most European countries the demand increased for high-paid occupations (managers and professionals) 
or very low-profile ones (such as cleaners, helpers in the construction and manufacturing sectors). More 
specifically, it has been observed that despite the greater misfortune of low-qualified workers on the 
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labour  market,  in  many  countries  their  employment  increased  significantly,  on  average  by  18.4%  in 
Europe between 2000 and 2010. The figure can be explained by the fact that the demand for jobs like 
cleaners and street-sellers is not affected by either technology or offshoring: a labourer in the construction 
sector or a cleaning person cannot be hired in a developing country to perform their task, nor they can be 
replaced by a robot because their work requires interaction with people and/or the environment. Despite 
the greater demand for low-qualified tasks, polarisation may not solve the low-skilled unemployment 
problem  on  its  own:  workers  that  completed  secondary  education  to  work  as  technicians  or  as 
administrative assistants, and are made redundant because of globalisation of production or technological 
change,  may  have  started  to  compete  for  lower-skilled  professions  and  poorer  working  conditions 
compared to their previous position which, especially for those that worked in the manufacturing sector, 
entailed  better  contracts  protected  by  collective  agreements.  The  main  driver  for  such  change  is 
technology, which increasingly makes certain skills outdated and creates demand for new ones. 
Among individual-level explanations, migration needs to be taken into account. Data clearly indicate that 
in all countries (with the exception of the Czech Republic) migrant workers face a much higher risk of 
unemployment  than  local  workers  and  EU  nationals;  a  condition  that  is  not  necessarily  due  to  the 
migrants  being  less  qualified  than  the  natives.  Possible  explanations  for  the  higher  unemployment, 
underemployment and especially downskilling, as documented in the literature, are the recognition of 
their qualification credentials in the host country, language barriers, the lack of contacts in the labour 
market, etc.  
Figure 3. Unemployment rates by origin in 2012 
 
Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Survey. 
Last but not least, labour market detachment: long-term unemployment can significantly erode the skills 
of  a  worker  -  resulting  in  ever-decreasing  employment  opportunities.  In  troubled  times  for  labour 
markets it is worth remembering that at the aggregate level, long spells of unemployment can translate 
into a permanent loss of potential for the economy.  
The important lessons are that: 
o  Due to fuzzy conceptualisation, we hardly know how to measure the magnitude of the low-skilled 
phenomenon in Europe; 
o  The  ‘low-skilled’  label  can  hide  a  number  of  different  situations:  labour  market  detachment, 
migration, obsolete skills but also macroeconomic structural changes; 
o  One can be low-skilled after leaving school, but can also become so during working life. For this 
reason, the amount of low-skilled people in the labour force should not be considered solely as a stock 
variable but also as a flow.  
Moreover, a recent and innovative analysis of job advertisements in three countries, Czech Republic, 
Denmark and Ireland, reveals that the set of skills demanded for low and medium-skilled occupations is 
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very diverse by country. For example, Danish employers focus on non-cognitive skills such as customer 
approach,  precision,  loyalty,  flexibility,  empathy  and  the  ability  to  communicate,  whereas  in  Czech 
Republic, employers seem to prioritise formal qualifications and diplomas.  
Since not only the size, but also the structure and other characteristics of low-skilled unemployment differ 
in Bratislava and Copenhagen, we suggest that EU recommendations and national policies do not just 
take a differentiated view but also a holistic and sophisticated view of this phenomenon. For instance, if 
in one country high-skilled unemployment is due to the high presence of migrants, while at the same 
time what an employer values is formal diplomas, then rather than promoting lifelong leaning in general, 
measures and learning opportunities to facilitate diploma recognition would be more effective. Or, if 
being low-skilled is the result of technological change and the workforce is aged and poorly educated, 
then additional learning opportunities would be valuable for displaced workers.  
We therefore urge policy-makers to obtain a clear understanding of national (and local?) specificities and 
also promote lifelong learning and keeping up with new technology to shield workers from the risk of 
detachment from the labour market and skills obsolescence.  
3.  Concluding remarks 
The current economic crisis put the issues of skills and the labour market very high on the policy agenda. 
In addressing them, it is important to move beyond simplified narratives and generic policies and better 
understand actual phenomena. In this policy brief, we focused on two issues in order to explain how they 
tend to be misunderstood by EU-level institutions.  
The first concerns the perception of graduate unemployment and the oft-lamented lack of graduates in 
science,  technology,  engineering,  and  mathematics.  A  new  approach  to  the  study  of  returns  from 
education reveals that the insufficient supply of STEM graduates is, at least in part, attributable to the fact 
that  the  opportunity  cost  of  such  education  is  significantly  higher  compared  to  other  major  degree 
subjects. As a consequence, the problem cannot be solved by campaigns but needs to be tackled via 
incentives, such  as  special  scholarships  or  fee-breaks.  This  is even  truer  for  women,  whose  apparent 
limited interest in pure science is consistent with the fact that other studies constitute a much better 
investment in human capital. Yet, the issue is more complex in this case, because an enduring gender-
prejudice also needs to be fought.  
As far as the low-skilled population is concerned, we invite EU and national policy makers to invest in a 
better understanding of the complexities of phenomena in a holistic way. The ‘low-skilled’ label hides a 
number  of  different  situations:  labour  market  detachment,  migration,  obsolete  skills  and  structural 
macroeconomic changes. Moreover, one can be low-skilled after leaving school but can also take on this 
label during working life. For this reason, the proportion of low-skilled people in the labour force should 
not be considered solely as a stock variable, but also as a flow. 
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